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RECONCEIVING INTERNATIONAL HISTORY
Erez Manela
Matthew Connelly. Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2008. xiv + 521 pp. Illustrations, 
notes, and index. $35.00.
Few who read Matthew Connelly’s important new book will forget the 
opening scene. It is June 18, 1877, and the trial of freethinker, socialist, and 
women’s rights activist Annie Besant had just begun at the Queen’s Bench 
Court in London. Besant and her associate, Charles Bradlaugh, were on trial 
for circulating an “obscene pamphlet” by the American birth control advocate 
Charles Knowlton, which included explicit descriptions of sexual anatomy and 
contraceptive techniques such as condoms, sponges, douches, and withdrawal. 
Rising in her own defense, the twenty-nine-year-old Besant, “beautiful and 
brilliant,” explained why she had done it. Without birth control, she warned, 
England would become as overpopulated as China and suffer the same fate: 
war, famine, and disease (pp. 18–9). That very same year, Connelly notes, 
famine struck in both India and China and nativist riots against Chinese im-
migrants broke out in California. 
This startling juxtaposition of events forms the starting point of Connelly’s 
original and wide-ranging exploration of the history of the movement to con-
trol world population. This book joins a small but growing body of literature 
that is putting to rest the common perception that work on the history of 
international organizations and NGOs is bound to be a soporific alphabet 
soup full of indecipherable acronyms and mind-numbing dissections of 
institutional mission statements. Connelly has mined a vast array of NGO 
and international organization archives, including those of the International 
Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), the Rockefeller and Ford foundations, 
and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, as well as a plethora of pri-
vate papers, to distill a story full of dramatic encounters, striking discoveries, 
intriguing interpretations, and global historical significance. Fatal Misconception 
is not the first work to focus on the role of non-state actors in the history of 
international society.1 But Connelly’s methodological sophistication, narrative 
skill, and provocative arguments will no doubt energize the field and serve 
to encourage further work in it.
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The narrative begins in the late nineteenth century, when ruling elites in 
emerging nation-states in Europe and elsewhere regularly thought of popula-
tions in the aggregate as yet another resource to be managed and utilized by 
the state, and when scientists, officials, and intellectuals worked to measure 
and control both the quality and quantity of that resource. Connelly defines 
“population control” broadly, as encompassing not only the interrelated 
concerns with the quality and quantity of populations but also with its move-
ment, and his opening chapters weave a wide-ranging narrative involving 
anti-immigration movements, social Darwinism, scientific racism, phrenology, 
and the rise and influence of such concepts as the “Yellow Peril”, Lebensraum, 
and “race suicide.” Connelly’s main task, he writes, “is to discover, specifically, 
how such protean concepts evolve into norms, practices, and institutions that 
empower people or manipulate them, enrich or impoverish, give life or take 
it away, sometimes all at the same time” (p. 8). The demographic devastation 
of World War I intensified the fears of the West’s demographic decline, and 
in the ensuing decade Lothrop Stoddard’s warnings about “the rising tide of 
color” echoed even as Margaret Sanger’s advocacy of “birth control”—a term 
she coined in 1914—was gaining momentum. This was the age of eugenics, 
and Connelly reminds us that the term, associated today with pseudoscience 
and the Holocaust, was in its day often viewed as a progressive cause and 
supported by figures ranging from W. E. B. Du Bois to John Maynard Keynes. 
This period also saw the first international meetings on population, where 
ideas were debated, plans hatched, and connections made. For Connelly, these 
gatherings were pivotal in the development and operation of the movements 
to control world population. His account of the first such meeting, the World 
Population Conference convened in Geneva in 1927 by the International La-
bor Organization, introduces several of the story’s main themes. One is the 
marginalization of women, both as activists and as “targets,” by paternalistic, 
careerist male “experts” who populated the positions of power in academia 
and private foundations. The second is the tensions, disagreements, and 
rivalries—personal, ideological, and institutional—that dogged the movement 
throughout its history, and made the 1927 conference a “massive setback” that 
failed to mobilize an international movement for population control (p. 74). 
Despite the failure to mobilize internationally, however, ideas about popula-
tion control continued to develop. By the 1940s, family planning had become 
an important component in the package of social reforms that would create 
the postwar welfare state, and influential advocates such as Gunnar and Alva 
Myrdal emphasized the combination of welfare, education, and access to 
contraception as the way to better the lives of children and improve society 
at all levels. But as the cause of population control—or “family planning,” 
as it was becoming known in polite society—gathered speed, it also faced 
powerful opponents across continents and cultures. The Catholic Church 
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was first and foremost among them; not least, its influence on domestic U.S. 
politics convinced Franklin D. Roosevelt to keep the cause of family plan-
ning at arm’s length. But Mahatma Gandhi, too, was a firm opponent, telling 
Sanger when she came to see him that contraception was hedonism and that, 
in his view, only abstinence (and perhaps rhythm) was an acceptable method 
of regulating fertility.
Though the first three chapters of the book, which take the story down to 
the end of the Second World War, make for fascinating reading, they largely 
function as an extended introduction to the book’s central concern, the story 
of the massive family planning programs of the postwar world. While Con-
nelly has crafted a vivid, multi-faceted narrative on the earlier period, much 
of what he covers, from anti-immigration movements to eugenics to the 
career of Margaret Sanger, will generally be familiar to American historians 
of the period. Connelly’s research on the postwar period, on the other hand, 
has plowed territory into which few historians have yet ventured, and it is 
the story of this period that stands at the analytical, narrative, and dramatic 
core of the book. 
Partly, this focus is dictated by the numbers. It is after 1945, after all, that 
the exponential population growth in the non-European world, long predicted 
with dread by Stoddard and his ilk, actually gained momentum, and the rising 
fear of such “differential fertility” among Western leaders and intellectuals 
exacerbated the crises of colonialism in the immediate postwar years. Even as 
an unprecedented number of censuses taken around the world allowed UN 
demographers to issue, for the first time, credible estimates of “world popu-
lation,” the French demographer Alfred Sauvy argued that without a world 
government the very notion of a single “world population” was meaningless. 
Instead, Sauvy proposed, there were in fact three worlds: the capitalist and 
the communist, which were headed toward convergence in modernity, and a 
“third world,” caught in a “cycle of misery” (p. 153). Though Sauvy called for 
assistance to the Third World, his vision, Connelly notes, was driven by the 
fear that accepting the idea of a “world population” would legitimize demands 
for unfettered migration and the global redistribution of land and resources. 
The concept of the Third World, then, was forged to fence non-Europeans 
populations within their own regions.
Even with evidence of the runaway growth of the world’s population, 
however, progress for those who wanted to control it remained difficult. In 
the new international institutions established in the war’s wake, One World 
advocates such as Julian Huxley of UNESCO and John Boyd Orr of the Food 
and Agriculture Organization called for a global population policy. But they 
were rebuffed by an unlikely coalition of member states, including many 
Catholic, communist, and Arab countries, as well as the U.S. government, 
which feared critics at home and abroad. Dwight Eisenhower, for example, 
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privately worried about population growth in the Third World, but he would 
not touch the issue publicly for fear of attracting criticism from Catholics and 
other domestic opponents of contraception and accusations of racial genocide 
from Third World leaders whom he hoped to tempt into the American camp 
in the Cold War. 
Blocked within the UN system, population controllers regrouped outside 
it. One of Connelly’s achievements in this book is his reconstruction of the 
global postwar network of population controllers, carefully uncovering and 
tracing connections that ran between governments, private foundations, 
and the academy, and sketching out the sinews of power, money, and pres-
tige that held the system together. The founding event of this “population 
establishment”—an evocative term—was an invitation-only conference con-
vened by the philanthropist John D. Rockefeller, III, in Colonial Williamsburg 
in 1952. This conference brought together leading academic demographers with 
the Rockefeller Foundation’s money men and gave birth to the Population 
Council, which set out to expand and globalize the network by funding the 
training of demographers worldwide, many under Frank Notestein’s Office 
of Population Research at Princeton. Another central node in the network, the 
International Planned Parenthood Federation, was established in London that 
same year to coordinate activities across national affiliates.
If the core of the population establishment consisted of wealthy founda-
tions and prominent academics, Connelly also excavates its broad penumbra, 
populated by a gallery of curious characters. There was Dixie Cup baron Hugh 
Moore, who devoted his fortune to reducing the world’s poor population 
to ward off the dangers of communism. Household products heir Clarence 
Gamble fancied himself a birth control entrepreneur who wanted to develop 
cheap contraceptives—at one point he insisted on experimenting with sponges 
dipped in saltwater—and established his own outfit, the Pathfinder Fund, when 
mainstream organizations refused to give him control. And, with a subject as 
controversial as birth control, some of the most transformational developments 
were bound to occur outside the “establishment.” The birth control pill itself 
emerged by the early 1960s as a result of collaboration between International 
Harvester heiress Katharine McCormick and biologist Gregory Pincus, who 
co-founded and worked at the Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology 
after being denied tenure at Harvard.
The prominence of private money, most of it from U.S. sources, in the 
population establishment reflected the continued reluctance of major Western 
governments to support family planning programs oversea. But establishment 
experts, richly funded by Rockefeller and Ford money and ensconced at top 
universities, committees, and institutes, still managed to make headway with 
Third World leaders who viewed family planning as a central component 
of crash modernization programs. Pakistan’s authoritarian president Ayub 
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Khan, for example, took keenly to the IUDs shown to him by Notestein, and 
by the early 1960s the devices were already widely in use there, as well as 
under the modernizing, authoritarian regimes in Taiwan and South Korea. In 
populous India, family planning programs had been part of the government’s 
development vision since the first five-year plan in 1952, and by the early 
1960s they stood “at the very center of planned development,” with mobile 
vasectomy camps performing 158,000 sterilizations in 1962 (p. 192). Family 
planning programs received a further boost in 1966 when Indira Gandhi, a 
strong proponent, became prime minister.
By the mid-1960s, even the United States government was joining the band-
wagon. Lyndon Johnson saw support for family planning programs as a crucial 
part of his global war on poverty, and under his administration large sums of 
foreign aid began to flow to them. Much of the money was funneled through 
USAID’s population program, whose flamboyant chief, Reimert Ravenholt, 
took to such stunts as distributing condoms with his business card printed 
on the wrapper. Concern about world population growth reached fever pitch 
within the U.S. public as Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 bestseller The Population Bomb 
popularized apocalyptic demographic scenarios, and a rising environmentalist 
movement emphasized the dangers that “exploding” populations posed for 
the health of the planet. 
Even in the heyday of the population control movement, however, opposi-
tion remained broad and powerful. The Catholic Church, as staunch an op-
ponent as ever, made its influence felt both in international organizations and 
within the United States, and the Soviet bloc countries also generally opposed 
UN support for family planning programs in the Third World, perhaps view-
ing them as a capitalist design to shrink the size of the global proletariat. And 
while some postcolonial leaders, particularly in densely populated countries 
such as India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines, were enthusiastic, oth-
ers, including many in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa, remained 
resistant, some even accusing Western family planners of plotting racial geno-
cide. Within the United States, too, representatives of the oppressed such as 
the Black Panthers, the Nation of Islam, and labor leader Cesar Chavez took 
similarly dim views of domestic programs that encouraged contraceptive use 
in poor and minority communities.
The struggle between supporters and opponents came to an epic climax at 
the 1974 World Population Conference in Bucharest. With a keen eye for irony, 
Connelly points out that Romania, the host country, was at the time the only 
country in the world with an explicit, target bound policy for increasing its 
population, and that the conference chair was a father of six. By then, USAID 
had become a major supporter of family planning programs around the world, 
with funds often laundered through international organizations and NGOs. 
But foreign donors could not always control the programs that they helped 
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fund. National governments, though happy to accept international aid, insisted 
on retaining control, and sometimes they went farther than even the most 
gung ho NGO could countenance. In 1971, as a Gujarat official boasted that 
the sterilization of 223,060 people in just sixty days set “a new world record,” 
the IPPF reported that India was “going wild on vasectomy and tubectomy 
camps” and advised that support for the program be halted (pp. 292–3). 
Such excesses emboldened the opposition and helped turn the Bucharest 
conference into the “Waterloo of the population control movement” (p. 316). 
In addition to the usual sources of opposition, feminists now also rose to chal-
lenge the entrenched, male-dominated population establishment, arguing that 
existing family planning programs marginalized women and, if they were to 
continue at all, they would have to become only one part of a broad develop-
ment agenda that put the empowerment and welfare of women first. Indeed, 
for Connelly it was the rise of women—as activists within the movement and 
as subjects who had rights rather than objects that had to be controlled—that 
ultimately redeemed the family planning movement as a whole.
In India, increasingly coercive family planning initiatives culminated dur-
ing the Emergency Period of 1975–77 when Sanjay Gandhi, Indira’s dissolute 
younger son, led a “modernizing” assault on the urban poor that combined 
forced sterilization with slum clearance. For Connelly Sanjay, a violent, corrupt 
man who was even said to have slapped his own mother on one occasion, 
is the perfect metaphor for the population control movement as a whole: “A 
man with no formal title who answered to no one—not even his mother—
was just the kind of person to lead a population control campaign” (p. 318). 
And the shocking defeat of Gandhi’s Indian National Congress in the 1977 
elections that came in the wake of Sanjay’s campaign was in turn a fitting 
end to his attempt to rob India’s poor of their autonomy: “Something even 
more powerful, even more implacable, had finally defeated the ideology of 
population control: People voting, one by one” (p. 326).
The Bucharest Conference and the Indian Emergency serve as the climactic 
acts in the drama of the postwar population control movement. Over the next 
two decades, the old population establishment gradually fell apart under a dual 
assault from feminists and radicals on the left and resurgent pro-life conserva-
tives on the right. Thus, even as women and men who “grew their hair long” 
took over key positions in family planning organizations and reoriented them 
to focus on reproductive rights rather than on population control, conservatives 
such as Senator Jesse Helms worked to end all U.S. aid for family planning 
programs overseas (p. 329). This, of course, makes perfect sense: the idea of 
population control, an important component of the Cold War, high modernist, 
developmentalist consensus, fell victim to the same combined attack from left 
and right that destroyed that consensus itself.
The story, however, does not end there. Even as the international family 
planning establishment was disintegrating, the People’s Republic of China 
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launched the largest and most coercive family planning program in history. The 
widespread Chinese abuses, which included forced abortions and sterilizations 
in strict enforcement of the one child policy, in turn provided opponents of 
family planning with further ammunition to dismantle USAID’s population 
program in the Reagan era. For Connelly, the 1994 United Nation’s Cairo 
program, which emphasized reproductive rights over reproductive control, 
marked the final “instrument of surrender” of the international population 
control movement (p. 369).
In his conclusion, Connelly, somewhat surprisingly given the critical tone 
that pervades much of the text, urges us to judge the population controllers 
with empathy and in the context of their time. They believed they were facing 
an unprecedented crisis in human history and saw themselves as promoting 
progress, fighting poverty, and saving the planet. Their great error, he argues, 
was the attempt to plan other people’s families: “The great tragedy of population 
control, the fatal misconception, was to think one could know other people’s 
interests better than they knew it themselves” (p. 378). Citing studies that 
show that the education of women is the strongest correlate of lower fertility, 
Connelly concludes that ultimately it has been “the emancipation of women, 
not population control, that has remade humanity” (p. 375). It is a satisfy-
ingly neat conclusion; perhaps a bit too neat, inasmuch as it elides some of 
the complexities involved, not least the tensions between interests individual 
and societal, short-term and long-term, and the longstanding debates over the 
place and meaning of women’s emancipation in the global south. 
Even readers who do not fully embrace Connelly’s conclusions, however, 
will appreciate Fatal Misconceptions as a book that combines an original frame-
work and challenging interpretations with an engrossing narrative replete with 
drama, surprising discoveries, and memorable turns of phrase. Connelly’s 
reconstruction of the global population establishment is particularly compel-
ling. Bringing to bear a broad range of sources—far-flung archives, obscure 
committee reports, press accounts—he manages to conjure an extensive, dy-
namic network that connected a diverse array of individuals and organizations, 
including government agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. This 
network, though firmly anchored in the West, had global reach. It was bound 
together by social, professional, and institutional ties, with ideas, discourses, 
funds, and people constantly circulating throughout. Connelly’s methodology 
of research, framing, and narration in this book will be of special interest for 
those who seek, as Connelly does, to “see beyond the state” to other forces 
and institutions that have shaped the history of international society.2 
The book is somewhat less convincing when it turns to more conventional 
ground, as when it advances the argument that the postwar population control 
movement was essentially imperialism by other means. In order to make the 
argument, Connelly defines imperialism as the “pursuit of unaccountable 
power,” a definition so broad that readers may well doubt its usefulness. But 
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even if one accepts “unaccountable power” as a sufficiently precise descrip-
tion of empire and concedes that this is what population controllers wanted 
to achieve, there remains the distinction between the “pursuit” of such power 
and its actual attainment. Though many members of the international popu-
lation establishment held paternalistic, colonial attitudes toward the Third 
World poor—occasionally, Connelly shows, they were the same men who 
had previously served as colonial officials—they no longer held the ultimate 
power of decision. This now lay with postcolonial officials, and their appar-
ent enthusiasm for family planning programs—which the book occasionally 
notes but does not much explore—was crucial in launching and sustaining 
those programs. 
 The book uncovers compelling connections between the international move-
ment to control world population and the respective national programs, but it 
also makes it too easy to forget that the latter were more than simply compo-
nents of the former. To varying degrees, the book shows, the major postwar 
family planning campaigns—in India, China, Indonesia, and elsewhere—got 
ideas, technical aid, and funds from international sources. But their primary 
goal, at least in the eyes of the national leaders who pursued them, was surely 
not to limit world population as such but to shape the size and character of the 
nation. In the early 1950s, as the international population establishment was 
just beginning to cohere, family planning was already a part of independent 
India’s development plan, and in the mid-1970s, even as the international 
movement suffered its “Waterloo” in Bucharest, the Indian program was enter-
ing its most violent stage. And the largest, most coercive population control 
scheme of all, in the People’s Republic of China, was conceived and launched 
with few international connections, indeed just as the international movement 
entered what Connelly describes as a stage of terminal decline.
It will fall to other scholars to explore more fully the roles and perceptions 
of non-Western actors in the history of population control and to delve more 
deeply into the interplay between national construction and global governance 
that this story suggests. Fatal Misconception remains a significant achievement 
that opens up new horizons for U.S. and international historians. It sheds new 
light on the role of the United States in world affairs, one that looks beyond 
both the agencies of the U.S. government and the tentacles of its cultural and 
commercial influences to show how private foundations and academic experts 
came together in an epic effort to reshape humanity on the most intimate and 
the grandest of scales at once. In the process, Connelly has demonstrated the 
importance and richness of historical work on non-state actors, including phil-
anthropic foundations, NGOs, and international organizations for the novel 
perspectives that they offer on some of the most important and fascinating 
issues, methodological and substantive, before historians today. This book 
will stand as a pioneering effort and a challenging model in the burgeoning 
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historiography now emerging at the intersections of transnational, interna-
tional, and global history.
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